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The 21st century has seen the economic rise of China and the resultant increase 
in the influence of Chinese leaders on international affairs. The transformation of China 
into a global superpower in the past two decades has some American officials calling 
for drastic increases in American military spending to develop new warfighting 
capabilities against what they see as an emerging threat from an emboldened China. The
resultant emerging arms race in what the United States has dubbed a “New Era of Great 
Power Competition” I argue is counterproductive to the vital security interests of both 
countries and is—most importantly—not inevitable.
The fundamental issues at stake in the emerging arms race are the American 
pursuit of a national ballistic missile defense system and the reactionary Chinese 
development of hypersonic and MIRV technologies to counter any potential American 
advances in ballistic missile defense. Both countries would be better served by 
ratcheting down arms development as I prove using established political theory and the 
claims of top American military and political officials.  
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Is an Arms Race with China Inevitable?
“There are people who wish I wouldn’t refer to China as our 
enemy. But that’s exactly what they are.”1 These words were uttered 
in November 2015 by American presidential candidate, Donald J. 
Trump. After Trump’s election to America’s highest office, top 
scholars spoke out against this sort of threat inflation.2 Is China really 
a threat to the United States? Where is the source of this 
disagreement between the administration and academic 
professionals? 
Under the past three administrations, the American government
has been increasingly using the threat of a rising China to justify 
massive military budgets and investments into new warfighting 
technologies—particularly missile defense and nuclear arsenal 
modernization. Concerns about China’s annual increases in military 
spending are in large part fueling the narrative that America needs to 
build up its military to combat the erosion of its global hegemony. The
Trump Administration made its position clear when it used the 2018 
Nuclear Posture Review to explicitly state that American nuclear 
1 ““Journalist: As U.S. Retreats from World Stage, China Moves To 
Fill The Void,” NPR (NPR, January 3, 2018), 
https://www.npr.org/2018/01/03/575288560/journalist-as-u-s-
retreats-from-world-stage-china-moves-to-fill-the-void)
2 J. Stapleton Roy M. Taylor Fravel, “Opinion | China Is Not an 
Enemy,” The Washington Post (WP Company, July 3, 2019), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/making-china-a-us-enemy-
is-counterproductive/2019/07/02/647d49d0-9bfa-11e9-b27f-
ed2942f73d70_story.html)
strategy will now be focused on a new era of “Great Power 
Competition,” alluding to what it views as hostile actions by both 
Chinese and Russian actors.3
Chinese military spending is increasing, yes, but so is the size of
the Chinese economy. Some experts say China’s increased military 
expenditures and investments in new technologies warrant an 
American defense buildup in response. Others disagree, claiming 
many of the military measures the United States is taking to counter 
China’s rise are serving to diminish rather than bolster American security. 
Two key sticking points are the development of an American national missile defense 
system and the advent of new Chinese nuclear delivery platforms like MIRVs (multiple 
independently targeted reentry vehicles) and hypersonic weapons. Those in favor of an 
American national missile defense system argue that such a system is justified to protect
American cities from a limited attack by Chinese ICBMs (intercontinental ballistic 
missiles) while those against the development of such a system claim that missile 
defense forces adversaries to build up arms to ensure they can overcome the defense.
This paper will prove that a strategic arms race with China is not inevitable, and 
both nations would be better off devoting resources to other more pressing matters such 
as nuclear non-proliferation and counterterrorism operations. This report will prove that 
the Chinese military currently does not—and does not intend—to pose an existential 
threat to the nuclear strategic security of the United States. None of the nuclear delivery 
technologies China is developing are intended for warfighting, and the number of 
3 United States. 2018. Nuclear Posture Review report. Washington, 
DC: U.S. Dept. of Defense. Pg 6.
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nuclear arms Beijing would need to contemplate a first strike on the continental United 
States would be extremely costly and time consuming for the Chinese government to 
achieve.
Where is there Disagreement?
Much has been written on the rise of China by American scholars, journalists, 
think tanks, pundits, military planners, and politicians in recent years. China’s rapidly 
growing economic and military power has many American officials fearful of a future 
international system where the United States lacks much of the relative power and 
influence it enjoyed in the post-Cold War unipolar era. According to American political 
scientist Fareed Zakaria (writing in February 2020), “sometime in the last two years, 
American hegemony died.”4 Following the conclusion of the Cold War and in the 
absence of the Soviet Union to compete with for international spheres of influence, the 
United States was left to pursue a new world order, exerting unchallenged influence 
around the world as the sole remaining superpower. Throughout the past three unipolar 
decades, the United States was able to operate internationally relatively unchecked. 
Both allies and adversaries were chiefly subject to the international policy concerns of 
the United States. Washington was able to build broad multinational coalitions to fight 
in the Middle East and bring former Soviet states into NATO. 
In the past few years, Zakaria argues American hegemony has eroded as the 
country has retreated from the global stage.5 In this era of waning relative influence of 
4 Fareed Zakaria, “The Self-Destruction of American Power,” Foreign
Affairs, December 31, 2019, www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2019-
06-11/self-destruction-american-power)
5 Ibid.
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American power we will examine the perspectives of those who agree the United States 
should bolster its nuclear arms and missile defenses in response to China’s own 
increased military capability, and those who disagree and argue the United States 
should refrain from a military buildup that could lead to a spiraling unnecessary arms 
race.
Arguments Against American Ballistic Missile Defense and Nuclear Modernization
American missile defense efforts lead to a classic playing out of “the security 
dilemma.”6 Under Robert Jervis’s concept, when the United States seeks heightened 
security through missile defense, China’s security will be threatened. This provokes a 
response from the threatened state, which can in turn be seen by the first state as a 
justification for its defensive investments, leading to an intensifying arms race.7
Kenneth N. Waltz, the father of structural realism, argued that the diffusion of 
nuclear weapons could be better for worldwide stability. As a pillar of structural 
realism, Waltz claims “states must help themselves by providing for their own 
security.”8 This logic justifies the Chinese government’s initial nuclear test in 1964 and 
6 Jervis, Robert. "Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma." World 
Politics 30, no. 2 (1978): 167-214. Accessed May 18, 2020. 
www.jstor.org/stable/2009958.
7 Eugene Gholz, Benjamin Friedman & Enea Gjoza (2019) Defensive 
Defense:
A Better Way to Protect US Allies in Asia, The Washington Quarterly,
42:4, 171-189, DOI:
10.1080/0163660X.2019.1693103
8 Sagan, Scott Douglas., and Kenneth Neal Waltz. The Spread of 
Nuclear Weapons: an Enduring Debate: with New Chapters on Iran, 
Iraq, and North Korea, and on the Prospects for Global Nuclear 
Disarmament. Thirded. New York, NY: Norton, 2013. Pg. 5.
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pursuit of a subsequent extended nuclear program.9 While China’s nuclear arsenal was 
initially developed to deter the much stronger neighboring Soviet Union from attack, 
the fact that each was a nuclear power caused them to deal carefully with each other for 
the duration of the Cold War. Waltz argues nuclear weapons were the key to regional 
stability between Moscow and Beijing. He asserts, “Nuclear weapons caused China and 
the Soviet Union to deal cautiously with each other.”10 Even as soon as China had tested
a singular nuclear weapon the Soviet Union had to consider that any aggressive action 
they took against their Chinese neighbors could potentially escalate to nuclear war. 
Even though Beijing’s nuclear arsenal was at the time (and still remains) much smaller 
than Moscow’s, the chance of incurring a retaliatory nuclear strike was enough to 
prevent Moscow from any substantial aggressive action—conventional or nuclear—on 
Chinese soil.
While initial Chinese missile technology focused on deterring a Soviet first 
strike with intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs), latter ICBM development 
would eventually ensure Chinese leaders’ capability to deter the United States as well. It
was rational for Chinese leaders to develop the capability to deter an ideologically 
opposed superpower in 1981 when the People’s Liberation Army’s DF-5 ICBM was 
9 Declaration of the Government of the People's Republic of 
China" Renmin Ribao, 16 October 1964, via: 
http://news.xinhuanet.com.
10 Sagan, Scott Douglas., and Kenneth Neal Waltz. The Spread of 
Nuclear Weapons: an Enduring Debate: with New Chapters on Iran, 
Iraq, and North Korea, and on the Prospects for Global Nuclear 
Disarmament. Thirded. New York, NY: Norton, 2013. Pg. 12.
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first operational, and it remains rational for the PLA to maintain that capability in 
2020.11
Applying Waltz’s theory to the current Sino-American arms race, we can see 
how the American withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty in 2002 
could create a rational incentive for the Chinese government to act to ensure their 
nuclear deterrent remained potent in the face of potential future American missile 
defense advances. China’s reasoning for pursuing upgraded nuclear technologies may 
be further explained by Waltz’s position that perhaps the only technological 
advancement that could alter the fundamental principles behind effective strategic 
deterrence is a “ballistic missile defense breakthrough.”12 Effectively, by augmenting 
their deterrent with MIRV and hypersonic capabilities the Chinese military is hedging 
their national security by ensuring that even if American leaders are so misguided as to 
believe their ballistic missile defense could protect the continental United States from a 
limited Chinese ICBM attack, they will never be in a position where a disarming first 
strike would be rational. 
Hans M. Kristensen, Director of the Nuclear Information Project at the 
Federation of American Scientists, agrees with Waltz.13 He cites the 2015 Department 
of Defense annual report on the Chinese military, which was the first affirmation by the 
11 “How Is China Modernizing Its Nuclear Forces?,” ChinaPower 
Project, December 18, 2019, https://chinapower.csis.org/china-
nuclear-weapons)
12 Sagan, Scott Douglas., and Kenneth Neal Waltz. The Spread of 
Nuclear Weapons: an Enduring Debate: with New Chapters on Iran, 
Iraq, and North Korea, and on the Prospects for Global Nuclear 
Disarmament. Thirded. New York, NY: Norton, 2013. Pg. 7.
13 Hans M. Kristensen, “Pentagon Report: China Deploys MIRV 
Missile,” Federation Of American Scientists, May 11, 2015, 
https://fas.org/blogs/security/2015/05/china-mirv/)
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American military that China had deployed MIRV capability on DF-5B ICBMs capable
of reaching the United States. The report concludes the reasoning for China’s 
development of MIRV technology is “intended to ensure the viability of China’s 
strategic deterrent in the face of continued advances in U.S. and, to a lesser extent, 
Russian strategic ISR, precision strike, and missile defense capabilities.”14 By the 
Pentagon’s own admission, it is Washington’s continued advancement in missile 
defense and upgraded strike technology that is forcing China to build up its own arms in
response. Kristensen sums up the how counterproductive the missile defense endeavor 
is:
“… how ironic that the US missile defense system – intended 
to reduce the threat to the United States – instead would seem to 
have increased the threat by triggering development of MIRV on 
Chinese ballistic missiles that could destroy more US cities in a potential
war.”15
Kristensen’s view is shared by many political science scholars and defense analysts. 
Waltz agrees, stating that the worst thing about missile defense “is that merely setting 
development and deployment in motion has damaging effects on us and others.”16 This 
demonstrates that some of the world’s leading analysts and even many in the American 
Department of Defense agree that missile defense is damaging to national security. 
14 “ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS: Military and Security 
Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2019.” 
Department of Defense. Department of Defense, May 2, 2019.Page 
31.
15Hans M. Kristensen, “Pentagon Report: China Deploys MIRV 
Missile,” Federation Of American Scientists, May 11, 2015, 
https://fas.org/blogs/security/2015/05/china-mirv/).
16 Sagan, Scott Douglas., and Kenneth Neal Waltz. The Spread of 
Nuclear Weapons: an Enduring Debate: with New Chapters on Iran, 
Iraq, and North Korea, and on the Prospects for Global Nuclear 
Disarmament. Thirded. New York, NY: Norton, 2013. Pg. 103.
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Perhaps most dangerous of all, Waltz argues that the “shield makes the sword usable.”17 
Even if American civilian and military leaders never plan to make an offensive first 
strike on an adversary, any potential nuclear-equipped foe is forced to innovate to defeat
the perception that their own deterrent may not be credible in the face of a disarming 
first strike coupled with a missile defense shield to eliminate any warheads not 
destroyed on the ground. China has been placed in just this situation and has acted 
according to what Waltz and Kristensen would have predicted.
Arguments in Favor of American Ballistic Missile Defense and Nuclear Modernization
Elbridge Colby, former US Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy 
and Force Development, claims in the title of a recent article, “If You Want Peace, 
Prepare for Nuclear War.”18 Colby argues for a nuclear warfighting strategy with 
flexible response options for the American military because he believes that 
“threatening to use [strategic] weapons in a limited war in defense of allies thousands of
miles from U.S. shores is just too extreme to be convincing and therefore unlikely to 
work.”19 The logic Colby uses in defense of his position—chiefly that some American 
interests overseas are peripheral—is actually not too far off the same logic employed by
Waltz, though the latter disagrees completely on the necessity of flexible nuclear 
warfighting capabilities. Both parties agree that the United States would be unlikely to 
employ strategic nuclear weapons in defense of interests whose coverage by the 
17 Ibid, 105.
18 Elbridge Colby, “If You Want Peace, Prepare for Nuclear War,” 
Foreign Affairs, January 28, 2019, 
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2018-10-15/if-you-
want-peace-prepare-nuclear-war)
19 Ibid.
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American deterrent is cloudy. Waltz claims, “Nuclear weapons deter adversaries from 
attacking one’s vital—and not one’s minor—interests.”20 Colby argues that only 
through developing a flexible tactical nuclear response can the United States effectively 
deter far-flung allies who are potentially vulnerable to Chinese and Russian attacks. He 
specifically lists Taiwan and Japan as targets of potential Chinese aggression.21
Colby goes on to claim that the United States has fallen behind Russia and 
China’s ability to conduct limited nuclear war. He references the 2018 Nuclear Posture 
review’s acknowledgment of this “gap” and claims that even the extensive 
modernization campaigns called for by the report fall short of providing the American 
military with the respective response options he is arguing for. Specifically, Colby calls 
on the United States to “develop modern tactical nuclear warheads and delivery systems
designed for a regional military fight.”22 This would require massive investments to be 
made into further updating the American nuclear arsenal beyond the what is called for 
in the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review. The United States’ nuclear arsenal is currently 
designed to effectively deter a Cold War era opponent, rather than a regional nuclear 
power seeking to claim territory, Colby claims, and it thus not suited for the modern 
security environment.23
20 Scott Douglas Sagan, and Kenneth Neal Waltz. “The Spread of 
Nuclear Weapons: an Enduring Debate: with New Chapters on Iran, 
Iraq, and North Korea, and on the Prospects for Global Nuclear 
Disarmament.” Thirded. New York, NY: Norton, 2013. Pg. 16.
21 Ibid.
22 Elbridge Colby, “If You Want Peace, Prepare for Nuclear War,” 
Foreign Affairs, January 28, 2019, 
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2018-10-15/if-you-
want-peace-prepare-nuclear-war
23 Ibid.
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In order to protect American regional allies—chiefly Taiwan and Japan—the 
United States needs to build tactical nuclear weapons that allow Washington to threaten 
a diversified nuclear and conventional response to regional Chinese aggression. Colby 
claims in a hypothetical scenario that China could use force to invade and occupy 
Taiwan. In response a limited nuclear option would allow American forces to target and
destroy all Chinese tactical nuclear and conventional forces earmarked for use in the 
campaign.24 This reasoning assumes that Washington’s limited preemptive tactical 
nuclear strike on China’s tactical nuclear arms would not be seen by Beijing as the 
grounds to launch a second strike on the United States. Beijing maintains a no-first use 
policy regarding its nuclear weapons and would thus be unlikely to use them first even 
in a limited nuclear war of aggression.25 Colby does not address the extreme risks that 
the United States would have to consider before striking any of China’s nuclear arsenal,
whether they be tactical or strategic weapons. It would not be hard to imagine Chinese 
leaders perceiving any American attack, conventional or nuclear, on any hypothetical 
tactical Chinese nuclear weapons as an attempt at a disarming first strike, which could 
force Chinese leaders—observing an imminent threat to their ability to deter any further
American aggression—into a “use it or lose it” mentality. If this was the case, both the 
United States and Chinese would suffer heavy casualties in the nuclear exchange sure to
follow.
24 Ibid.
25 “National Intelligence Council,” Federation Of American Scientists
– Science for a safer, more informed world., accessed May 19, 2020, 
https://fas.org/irp/threat/missile/nie99msl.htm).
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Methods of Analysis Overview
The following methodologies will be used to prove that an American arms race 
with China is not inevitable:
Budgetary Analysis
American and Chinese defense expenditures will be compared respectively over 
the past two decades. American budgets will be drawn from official American defense 
white papers, while Chinese reports will rely on estimates from the American 
intelligence community and independent analysts. This is due to the fact that there are 
often considerable discrepancies between what the Chinese military claims it spends 
and what outsiders estimate are actual expenditures.26
Outline of Alleged Tit-for-Tat
This section will provide specific dates to deliver background and context for 
the current geopolitical situation between the United States and China. By peeling back 
the curtain of history insights will be generated about which side may have been 
provoking action by the other. This will also serve to examine whether the actions of 
either country were related to relative changes in overall posturing through both rhetoric
and concrete measures.
Key Weapons Systems
Through analysis of key weapons systems on both sides of the Pacific, this 
section will assess the capabilities resulting from new advances in military technology. 
26 “What Does China Really Spend on Its Military?,” ChinaPower 
Project, May 15, 2020, https://chinapower.csis.org/military-spending/
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The weapons systems that will receive the most attention in this report are the same that
have received the most attention by the American press and officials. Specifically, this 
report will focus on Chinese hypersonic weapons, and Chinese MIRV technology in 
addition to American efforts at developing and deploying a national missile defense.
Analysis of the Hype the Chinese Threat
Finally, this report will offer commentary and analysis of the developments 
often pointed to as evidence that the United States should focus military spending on 
countering China. In this section the strategic implications of the aforementioned 
Chinese weapons systems will be analyzed, in addition to argumentative holes in favor 
of an American national missile defense, a potential Taiwan crisis, and the Chinese 
island-building and militarization campaign in the South China Sea. Through analyzing 
the sources of hype and excitement on all of these issues we can see how American 
strategic nuclear security is impacted and determine whether any of these actions make 
an arms race inevitable.
12
Budgetary Analysis
The Chinese People’s Liberation Army has seen its budget increase every year 
since 2000—often with double-digit percentage increases.27 The Stockholm 
International Peace Research Institute has estimated these annual increases in spending 
have raised total Chinese military expenditures from $41.3 billion in 2000 to $239.2 
billion in 2018 (in nominal 2017 USD).28 This represents an increase in Chinese defense
spending of 479% over 18 years. Many in the United States have pointed to the fact that
American military spending has only increased 47.5% in the same time period (from 
$429.5bn in 2000 to $633.6bn in 2018) as reason to be concerned, though percentage 
increases do not explain the whole picture.
Total American military spending still dwarfs total Chinese spending with 
aggregate Chinese expenditures totaling only 37.8% of the 2018 American military’s 
annual appropriations.29 The United States has sustained a high level of spending since 
World War II, as Cold War tensions provided the motivation for massive military arms 
races and budgets. Additionally, global commitments such as the recent wars in Iraq 
and Afghanistan have given the United States military further reason to continuously 
invest in robust military capabilities. This sustained spending for the better part of a 
century has allowed the United States armed forces to have a considerable stockpile of 
technical expertise and warfighting materiel to draw upon.
27 “China Is World's Biggest Exporter of Armed Drones, Says 
Report,” South China Morning Post, March 11, 2019, 
https://www.scmp.com/news/china/military/article/2189604/china-
sells-weapons-more-countries-and-biggest-exporter-armed)
28 “What Does China Really Spend on Its Military?,” ChinaPower 
Project, May 15, 2020, https://chinapower.csis.org/military-
spending/)
29 Ibid.
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By comparison, the People’s Liberation Army has more or less had to play 
catch-up to capabilities the American military has enjoyed for years.
14
Figure 1: Significant Military Milestones of the United States and China.30 
This is particularly the case in terms of nuclear and power projection capabilities, where
the United States has long held a significant advantage. The significant gaps seen in 
Figure 1 demonstrate how the Chinese military, even in recent years, has lagged 
significantly behind the United States in terms of technical prowess and capabilities. 
One potential reason the Chinese military has seen its budget increase so 
substantially is that the budget is linked to the country’s overall economy. China’s gross
domestic product (GDP) has grown significantly since 2001, when Beijing officially 
joined the World Trade Organization (WTO).31 China’s economy has exploded as 
greater access to world financial markets and international capital surged into the 
country. As China’s economy grew, so too did its military expenditures, though the 
Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has devoted relatively lower resources to the military 
compared to the United States over the same period. 
30 John Pike, “Military,” People's Liberation Army Versus the US 
Military, accessed May 19, 2020, 
https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/china/pla-v-us.htm)
31 “WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION,” WTO, accessed May 19, 2020, 
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/countries_e/china_e.htm)
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Figure 2: American and Chinese Military Spending as a Percentage of GDP32 
The extraordinary growth of China’s economy has allowed Beijing’s military budget to 
expand, not a change in government priorities. As the Chinese state has grown more 
prosperous in recent years, the government has been able to devote more of the share of 
funding away from military uses, even as total military spending has increased every 
year.33 This is demonstrated in the following figure.
32 Peter E Robertson, “Measuring Hard Power: China's Economic 
Growth and Military Capacity,” Research Gate, March 2015, https://
www.researchgate.net/figure/Military-Spending-Share-of-
GDP_fig2_275338533)
33 “China's Defence Spending: a Question of Perspective?,” IISS, 
accessed May 19, 2020, 
https://www.iiss.org/blogs/military-balance/2019/05/china-defence-
spending)
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Figure 3: Chinese Defense Budget as a Share of GDP (%) 
China does not disclose many details of their military spending, though given the 
numbers and types of new nuclear weapons systems under development, it seems likely 
that Beijing is also devoting a significant share of military appropriations to nuclear 
modernization through new solid-fueled road-mobile ICBMs and a substantial nuclear 
submarine research and development program.34
Some experts have argued that when American and Chinese military budgets are
compared using purchasing power parity (PPP) rather than nominal dollar amounts that 
34 “What Does China Really Spend on Its Military?,” ChinaPower 
Project, May 15, 2020, https://chinapower.csis.org/military-
spending/)
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Chinese spending is much closer to the level of the United States.35 One report from the 
World Bank finds that, given the same amount of USD spent, China can effectively 
purchase 2.5x more domestically per dollar than the United States.36 While this 
argument makes it seem as though China can stretch military spending farther, a 
country’s nationwide purchasing power is not directly correlated with the costs of 
military equipment and procurement.37 
While nominal budgetary comparisons omit details that can have significant 
influences across different national economies, the lack of transparency in the Chinese 
military reporting structure makes comparisons by PPP equally arbitrary.38 Therefore, 
making defense budgeting decisions based off relative spending by an adversary does 
not make for an effective fiscal strategy. Spending the appropriate amount needed to 
maintain national security is a more effective strategy than reacting to budgetary posture
changes by an adversary. The following figure displays the nominal defense budgets of 
the United States, China, and Russia. Though both the China and Russia demonstrate 
significant growth in military expenditures over the time period, note that the United 
States maintains a significant lead throughout.39 This provides more evidence of 
35 “Price Level Ratio of PPP Conversion Factor (GDP) to Market 
Exchange Rate,” International Comparison Program Database (The 
World Bank), accessed May 19, 2020, 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/pa.nus.pppc.rf)
36 Ibid.
37 Rachel Zissimos, “Putting Defense Spending in Context: Simple 
Comparisons Are Inadequate,” The Heritage Foundation, accessed 
May 19, 2020, https://www.heritage.org/defense/report/putting-
defense-spending-context-simple-comparisons-are-inadequate)
38 “Frequently Asked Questions,” SIPRI, accessed May 19, 2020, 
https://www.sipri.org/databases/milex/frequently-asked-
questions#PPP)
39 Katharina Buchholz and Felix Richter, “Infographic: China's 
Increased Military Spending That Trump Cancelled the INF Treaty 
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Washington’s enduring lead in defense spending and the accrued advantages of 
expertise and procurement over time.40
Figure 4: Chinese and Russian Military Spending Relative to the United States in 
Nominal 2017 USD41
The United States is also planning a significant overhaul to its nuclear arsenal with 
projected costs of nuclear modernization over the next 30 years exceeding $1.7 trillion 
when adjusted for inflation.42 While this is surely a significant cost, the figure is not 
expected to exceed more than 6% of total American defense spending over the period.43 
For,” Statista Infographics, February 1, 2019, 
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The massive amounts the Washington is committed to keep spending on its armed 
forces has a historical precedent and the United States has demonstrated a proven 
capability to maintain high levels of spending over long time frames even in the midst 
of other challenges at home and abroad while the Chinese government’s military 
expenditures in large part dependent on the ability of its economy to continue to grow. 
20
Timeline of Alleged Tit-for-Tat
American Missile Defense has Focused on China Since the Beginning 
In the midst of the Cold War the United States made several attempts at fielding 
a national missile defense system. Each attempt was met with significant political and 
technical hurdles on the way to becoming operational, but rather than cancel the 
programs outright, the systems were repurposed. Specifically, national missile defense 
projects were adapted from defending against the incumbent Soviet threat to the 
emerging—and limited—Chinese threat.
Early American Missile Defense Efforts
American military planners have dreamed of a missile defense program since 
the end of World War II. Work began in earnest on a missile defense system in the 
midst of the Cold War when the Nike-Zeus system received funding in 1956.44 The 
Nike-Zeus system evolved from the previous 1954 Nike-Ajax anti-aircraft system, 
designed to target and destroy subsonic strategic bombers at high altitude. Even as the 
Ajax system was being deployed, it became apparent that ICBMs were developing into 
the principle nuclear threat facing the United States. To address this, the Nike-Zeus 
system was developed as the first ABM (anti-ballistic missile) system fielded by any 
nation. The system required a “95-100%” defense rate to be considered operationally 
effective, which led to the decision to employ nuclear warheads on the interceptor 
missiles themselves, designed to detonate at altitude to destroy volleys of incoming 
44 “US Ballistic Missile Defense Timeline: 1945-Today.” Union of 
Concerned Scientists. Accessed April 28, 2020. 
https://www.ucsusa.org/resources/us-missile-defense-timeline.
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ICBMs simultaneously.45 Very quickly the United States Army, tasked with point 
defense (defending against static targets like cities), encountered serious operational 
limitations with the Nike-Zeus system. 
The radar targeting and computing technology of the time was only capable of 
first tracking one, and then single-digit numbers of incoming targets simultaneously.46 
This meant that the system was quickly overwhelmed even by relatively small 
quantities of missiles incoming simultaneously. Due to the high required interception 
rates to consider the system a success, the technology of the time limited the Nike-Zeus 
system’s ability to perform when fielded. 
Additionally, the system was crippled in the event multiple volleys of ICBMs 
were launched. Nike-Zeus could eliminate the first wave fairly effectively, but the 
atmospheric nuclear blast caused by the Nike-Zeus warhead’s detonation would create 
an environment in the upper atmosphere where the system’s own ground-based radars 
would be blinded by the resultant radio interference. This crippling weakness was never
overcome in the design process and plans for a wide deployment of Nike-Zeus suffered 
greatly and were eventually cancelled in early 1963.47
Following the cancellation of the Nike-Zeus program, the Soviet Union 
deployed the limited “Galosh” ABM system as a point-defense system designed to 
protect Moscow from an American ICBM attack. Like its contemporary American 
counterparts, the Galosh was unable to stop any large missile attacks but was 
45 “Nike Zeus: The U.S. Army's First Anti-Ballistic Missile.” Missile 
Defense Agency, October 20, 2009. 
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nonetheless deployed with an estimated 64 nuclear-tipped interceptor missiles across 4 
launch sites.48 When reports of the Soviet system were picked up by the media there was
public outcry within the United States for the deployment of an American ABM 
system.49 Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara had always been critical of the idea of
fielding a nationwide ABM system because he feared such a system would have a 
destabilizing effect on the security situation under the logic of mutually assured 
destruction (MAD).50 Additionally, McNamara determined an ABM system could not 
be developed to the scale required to defend the United States from a Soviet ICBM 
attack consisting of thousands of warheads.51 A smaller, “light” system could still be 
deployed, but could only be effective against a smaller threat.52
American Missile Defense Targets China
The Johnson administration instead offered to deploy a limited missile defense 
system with the rationale that it would be small enough not to destabilize the strategic 
balance of power with the Soviet Union, but large enough to offer considerable 
protection against the arrival of the Chinese nuclear deterrent. China had tested its first 
nuclear device in 1964, and American projections estimated a Chinese nuclear deterrent 
48 “SMDC History: Soviet Union Deploys Galosh.” www.army.mil. 
Accessed April 28, 2020. 
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ScientistsXXIII, no. 10 (December 1967): 26–31. 
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would be reasonable to build a missile defense system to counter, given the significantly
smaller projected number of Chinese ICBMs that would be capable of reaching the 
United States.53 In remarks given in September of 1967, Secretary of Defense 
McNamara announced the United States would build a “light” “Chinese-oriented” 
missile defense system to defend against “conditions under which China might 
miscalculate.”54 McNamara acknowledged the danger in building a larger “heavy” 
ABM system aimed at defending against Soviet attacks noting that if the Soviets 
perceived that their own nuclear second-strike capability was threatened by the 
existence of an American ABM system there would be “a strong inducement for the 
Soviets to vastly increase their own offensive forces.”55 McNamara seemed relatively 
unconcerned with the Chinese responding by building up nuclear arms to overwhelm an
American missile defense system, possibly due to the fact that tensions between the two
countries were relatively low compared to the tensions between the United States and 
Soviet Union at that time. 
The system McNamara ordered built was named Sentinel. Sentinel was tasked 
with providing “area protection for US population centers against a possible Chinese 
missile attack.”56 The Sentinel system could also be used to “defend [American] land-
based deterrent forces against a larger Soviet threat.”57 The latter objective would be the
53 Ibid.
54 Robert S. McNamara. “Remarks by Secretary of Defense Robert S. 
McNamara, September 18, 1967” Bulletin of the Atomic 
ScientistsXXIII, no. 10 (December 1967): 26–31. 
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primary purpose of the system eventually deployed, renamed Safeguard and only tasked
with defending American silo-based ICBMs from Soviet and Chinese first strike 
attacks, although McNamara himself noted the system could only defend against limited
“light” strikes.58
American Missile Defense Temporarily Shelved
McNamara’s proposed limited ballistic missile defense was short lived. While 
Safeguard was under development prior to installation around ICBM silos in North 
Dakota, the United States and Soviet Union signed the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty 
(ABM) in 1972, eliminating the possibility of growing the system to provide a “heavy” 
nationwide missile defense against a Soviet strike.59 The single Sentinel site that had 
been initially constructed in North Dakota was kept on by the United States under the 
provisions of the ABM Treaty and was eventually decommissioned in 1976 due to 
insurmountable technical constraints caused by the operation of the system itself. 
Specifically, the blinding effect of detonating the nuclear warheads carried onboard 
interceptor missiles on the ground-based radars and the extreme financial costs 
associated with the project were cited as reasons for its cancellation.60 The House 
Appropriations Committee and later the Senate voted to dismantle the site entirely after 
less than a year of operational testing, citing that as the “Soviet Union installed 
58 Robert S. McNamara. “Remarks by Secretary of Defense Robert S. 
McNamara, September 18, 1967” Bulletin of the Atomic 
ScientistsXXIII, no. 10 (December 1967): 26–31.
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offensive missiles with multiple warheads the usefulness of Safeguard missiles would 
be “essentially nullified.”61 By the time Safeguard was cancelled China had yet to field 
an ICBM capable of reaching the United States (it wouldn’t be until 1981 that the DF-5 
ICBM would be operationally deployed), thus the system the Johnson Administration 
had called for to defend against a potential miscalculated Chinese ICBM strike was 
never even operational at the same time such a threat even existed.62
Missile Defense Takes Center Stage in the Final Years of the Cold War
Following the decade of détente Ronald Reagan was elected to the office of 
President and set his eyes on the stars. Reagan proposed the Strategic Defense Initiative 
(SDI)—“Star Wars” as it was known by its critics—with the goal of making nuclear 
weapons “impotent and obsolete.”63 SDI proposed an immensely complex system of 
orbital lasers and interceptors designed to destroy incoming ICBMs in space.64 While 
many in the American public approved of the proposed system, the international 
community—and many within Reagan’s own administration—were shocked at what the
president had proposed. SDI as a concept was based on “technology that had not yet 
61 John W. Finney. “Safeguard ABM System to Shut Down; $5 Billion 
Spent in 6 Years Since Debate.” The New York Times. The New York 
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been invented” and thus posed massive challenges for the American scientific and 
defense communities tasked with its development.65 
The SDI program spent through billions in defense appropriations under 
Reagan, but by the end of his presidency had little to show for all of the time and 
resources spent. The program would ultimately lead to the inability of the United States 
and Soviet Union to reach an agreement at the 1986 Reykjavik Summit to achieve 
unprecedented disarmament, as Reagan refused to give up the program even in 
exchange for Soviet concessions.66 
After Reagan’s presidency and collapse of the Soviet Union funding for SDI 
faded as national security concerns evolved and the United States took on other 
priorities. The program was never officially cancelled and has continued under different
names with different objectives under subsequent administrations.67 Today, the legacy 
of SDI is the Missile Defense Agency, explored in a later section.
The Rumsfeld Commission: Missile Defense Reenters Debate
The Clinton administration saw heated partisan fighting in the Senate about 
appropriations for missile defense. A commission chaired by Senate Republican Donald
Rumsfeld in 1998 argued for increased missile defense spending but used widely 
disputed information to provide evidence as to a missile defense system’s practicality.
The Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States 
(henceforth known as the Rumsfeld Commission) was part of a larger push within the 
65 Ibid.
66 Ibid.
67 Ibid.
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United States Senate among a group of fervent missile defense advocates.68 The report 
produced by the commission was intended to prove the necessity of an American 
missile defense system and often took worst-case estimates of the capabilities and 
intents of potentially hostile foreign powers, rather than focusing on what was likely to 
occur.69 For instance, contrary to the estimates of the overall American intelligence 
community, the 1998 report claimed that within 5 years a rogue nation would have the 
capability of launching an ICBM at the continental United States.70 To make this 
assessment, the commission lowered the threshold of what was considered a threat to 
what “could” happen rather than what was “likely” to occur.71 This effectively made the
threat of long-range ballistic missiles to the United States homeland more pressing than 
the military and intelligence community had previously determined in their own reports.
By lowering the burden of proof, the report was able to achieve its goals of making 
missile defense a core issue in American politics in the post-Cold War Era.
The Commission found the “threat to the U.S. posed by these emerging 
capabilities is broader, more mature and evolving more rapidly than has been reported 
in estimates and reports by the Intelligence Community.”72 The report essentially 
68 “Missile Wars | FRONTLINE.” PBS. Public Broadcasting Service, 
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undermines the more realistic conclusions reached by the broader American intelligence
apparatus regarding the immediacy of a threat to the Unites States. The timeliness of the
report was an important factor to its lasting impact. Even though many facts and figures 
had been stretched and the timelines shortened for so-called rogue states to attain long-
range nuclear-capable missile technology, when North Korea launched the Taepo Dong 
missile only six weeks later the Rumsfeld Commission’s conclusions suddenly seemed 
justified.73 Donald Rumsfeld himself expressed his apparent satisfaction that the 
commission’s findings had been vindicated, saying “God bless you Kim Jong.”74 
Top military officials still fought against the proposed development and 
deployment of a national missile defense system, arguing that any rogue regime need 
not waste time and resources developing a sophisticated long-range missile program. 
The Joint Chiefs of Staff at the time claimed “unconventional, terrorist-style delivery 
means” would be a much more likely threat to the United States from a rogue regime.75 
Why would a backwards state like North Korea devote treasure toward an ICBM 
program when they could instead use smuggling and other techniques to circumvent 
even the most robust American missile defense system? 
Regardless of long-term feasibility or the actual credibility of Pyongyang’s nascent 
threat, North Korea’s apparent breakthrough in three-stage missile technology would 
give new life to advocates of a national missile defense. 
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Missile Defense Becomes American Policy 
In 1999 the United States Congress passed National Defense Authorization Act, 
which included provisions for a national missile defense system as a formal part of 
American defense policy. The goals of national missile defense are 
“…to maintain and improve an effective, robust layered missile defense 
system capable of defending the territory of the United States, allies, 
deployed forces, and capabilities against the developing and increasingly
complex ballistic missile threat…”76
The Clinton administration would be relatively restrained in ceding substantial ground 
to advocates of national missile defense, by remaining a party to the ABM Treaty and 
ensuring missile defense was an area for research, not imminent deployment. The 
following administration would have no qualms withdrawing from arms control 
agreements and pursuing national missile defense deployment.
2000-2010: American Unipolarism and Chinese Growth
American Withdrawal from the ABM Treaty
When George W. Bush came to power in the United States in 2001, the United 
States was at peace. By the end of his first year in office, that would all change. The 
September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks would shake the American public and prompt the 
new administration to launch the country headfirst into an enduring “War on Terror.”77 
After 9/11, the Bush administration claimed that the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) 
76 “U.S. Department of Defense - Missile Defense Agency,” MDA, 
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Treaty was not suited to contemporary American security needs.78 With a new focus on 
combating terrorism, Bush sought the capacity to defend against missiles launched from
terrorist organizations and so-called “rogue-states.”79 To meet this goal, the provisions 
outlined in the landmark Cold War ABM Treaty would be jeopardized, potentially at 
the stake of long-term worldwide strategic security.
The ABM Treaty was an agreement between the United States and Russia (the 
Soviet Union at the time of signing in 1972). The treaty prohibited either party from 
developing national missile defenses that would have been detrimental to other nuclear 
powers’ security. The agreement specifically prohibited either nation from developing a
national missile defense against ICBMs, which the Bush administration argued were 
needed in the post 9/11 era. The 9/11 attacks gave Bush and his Secretary of Defense 
and long-time missile defense advocate Donald Rumsfeld the political justification they 
needed to withdraw from the treaty, which was announced in December, just months 
after the 9/11 attacks.80 
Following the withdrawal from the ABM Treaty, the Bush administration 
formed the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) with a mandate to develop and deploy a 
layered Missile Defense System to “defend the United States, its deployed forces, allies,
and friends from missile attacks in all phases of flight.”81 This broad mandate enabled 
the MDA to bring together knowledge and expertise in missile defense technology 
78 “Fact Sheets & Briefs.” The Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty at a
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https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/abmtreaty.
79 Ibid.
80 Ibid.
81 “U.S. Department of Defense - Missile Defense Agency,” MDA, 
accessed May 19, 2020, https://www.mda.mil/about/mission.html)
31
under one organization. In 2002, Bush’s Secretary of State, Donald Rumsfeld gave the 
Missile Defense Agency the mandate of deploying the Ground-Based Midcourse 
Defense (GMD) System by 2004.82 GMD remains the only missile defense system 
fielded by Washington with the objective of defending the entire continental United 
States.83
China Responds to American Missile Defense Objectives
Prior to the American withdrawal from the ABM Treaty , in July 2000 Chinese 
ambassador Sha Zukang described American missile defense efforts as a “direct threat 
to the effectiveness of China's existing limited nuclear force,” claiming China, “While 
determining the scale of its nuclear force, [cannot] but consider [missile defense]” as a 
factor.84 Later in November 2000, an official of the Chinese Foreign Ministry claimed, 
“As far as the US National Missile Defense is concerned if we are to protect stability of 
the global strategic balance, then this system shouldn't be built."85
Though China was not a signatory to the ABM Treaty, the restrictions placed on
the preeminent nuclear powers had allowed the Chinese government to comfortably rely
on a relatively small nuclear deterrent of hundreds—rather than thousands—of 
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warheads.86 With the withdrawal of the United States from the ABM Treaty and the 
Bush administration’s emphasis on deploying a national missile defense as soon as 
possible, Beijing was forced to begin research and development of technologies 
specifically designed to counter any eventual possible American national missile 
defense capabilities.87 
The most significant new Chinese nuclear weapons system fielding during this 
decade was the solid-fueled road-mobile DF-31 in 2006. The DF-31 is capable of 
targeting parts of the western United States from launchers in mainland China.88 The 
DF-31 was developed alongside the JL-2 SLBM, which would not be deemed 
operational aboard Jin-class submarines until 2015, following another decade of testing 
and development.89 Additionally, China began developing the DF-41 ICBM in earnest 
in the early 2000s, though the initial research is estimated to have begun in the 1980s 
according to estimates from industry experts.90 The DF-41 is an evolution of the DF-31 
missile and is the first Chinese ICBM to be developed from the beginning to be 
equipped with MIRV technology.91 While not officially disclosed in Chinese defense 
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white papers at the time, this is one of the earliest examples of Beijing’s pursuit of 
weapons systems specifically designed to penetrate missile defenses.92 The DF-41 
remains in a developmental stage to this day, though it is estimated it will be deployed 
soon.93
Writing in 2011, Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris wrote, “If the US 
ballistic missile defense system is expanded or improved, it could potentially trigger 
China to deploy missiles that have MIRVs and/or decoys.”94 Kristensen and Norris 
appear to have been correct in their assessment, as the American intelligence 
community estimates that many of the advanced Chinese nuclear weapons systems 
being fielded today had their developmental origins around the time the United States 
pulled out of the ABM Treaty.95 According to China’s published 2006 military strategy, 
China “endeavors to ensure the security and reliability of its nuclear weapons and 
maintains a credible nuclear deterrent force.”96 While not explicitly stated in this official
policy document, under this logic the pursuit of diversified and upgraded nuclear 
weapons delivery systems and physical dispersion and hardening of existing nuclear 
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assets seems rational. Later policy documents will explicitly cite the need for the 
People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to counter missile defenses.97
2010-2020: A New Era of Great Power Competition 
The PLA Rocket Force has been taking steps to diversify its ICBM arsenal with 
weapons systems capable of overwhelming missile defense systems. These new 
weapons make extensive use of decoys and MIRV (Multiple Independent Reentry 
Vehicle) systems according to a 2015 Senate Committee on Armed Services report.98 
The Pentagon’s 2019 Annual Report to Congress on Military and Security 
Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China states that China’s nuclear 
diversification is by China’s own admission:
“intended to ensure the viability of [China’s] strategic nuclear
forces in the face of continued advances in U.S. and, to a lesser extent,
Russian strategic ISR [intelligence,  surveillance, and reconnaissance],
precision strike, and missile defense capabilities.”99
Essentially, China is being forced to update its nuclear strike capabilities due to the 
evolving international threat environment. According to estimates from the CIA dating 
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from 1999, the PLA has had the capability to develop MIRV weapons systems for 
decades, but the cost associated with developing such systems and the PRC’s 
fundamental goals and commitment to a “no first use” nuclear doctrine has historically 
made pursuing MIRV capabilities unattractive.100
China Reiterates Reserved Nuclear Doctrine
Chinese military planners for a long time did not emphasize the development of 
a nuclear triad (land, air, and sea delivery capabilities), but have rather focused on 
deploying low-alert long-range intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICMBs), 
intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs), and a small number of nuclear-powered 
ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) with submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM)
capabilities. Rather than arms racing with other nations China has historically sought to 
keep “the nuclear force at the minimal level required by national security” and “has not 
and will never engage in nuclear arms race” according to an official statement delivered
at the 16th Beijing Seminar on International Security in 2016.101 However, in its most 
recent analysis, the Pentagon reports that China is in the process of testing new nuclear 
weapons systems ranging from land-based MIRV-equipped missiles to hypersonic 
weapons.102 This is breaking with decades of China’s relatively conservative nuclear 
doctrine in an effort to diversify the Chinese nuclear arsenal to ensure its survivability 
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and ability to launch a retaliatory second strike, effectively ensuring a credible 
deterrence doctrine.
China’s land-based arsenal has historically relied on a “low alert” strategy. The 
military arm responsible for China’s ICBMs (known as the Second Artillery Corps until
2006 when officially renamed the PLA Rocket Force), has historically stored nuclear 
warheads separately from their delivery systems.103 This strategy allows the PLA 
Rocket Force to launch a retaliatory strike in as little as 10 minutes of a hostile strike on
Chinese soil, while drastically reducing the possibility of an accidental or unauthorized 
launch.104 As threats have evolved the PLA Rocket Force has updated its weapons 
systems with the addition of road-mobile solid-fueled rocket systems like the DF-31 in 
2006.105 These systems utilize their geographic mobility to increase their survivability, 
and can be launched more quickly as they do not need to be fueled prior to launch.106 
However, with advances in American targeting and battlefield monitoring technology, 
Chinese military leaders may not be able to rely on road mobile systems alone. Through
recent conflicts in the Middle East, the United States has repeatedly demonstrated its 
military ability to strike mobile targets with precision accuracy from long ranges.107 This
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capability could negate the survivability road-mobile launchers have enjoyed in the 
past. 
Beijing Projects Power in the South China Sea
To give shorter range Chinese weapons a better platform to defend Chinese 
interests and assist in area-denial and anti-ship operations, the PLARF has placed 
surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) on the contested Spratly Islands in the South China Sea. 
Chinese President Xi Jinping claimed in 2015 that, “China does not intend to pursue 
militarization” on the Spratly Islands.108 The United States has repeatedly cited the 
militarization of the South China Sea as evidence of untrustworthy Chinese 
aggression.109
The 2018 Nuclear Posture Review Asserts Great Power Competition 
The American Department of Defense 2018 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) 
clearly outlines the international security environment from the American perspective 
by asserting: “Since 2010 we have seen the return of Great Power competition.”110 
Additionally, the 2018 NPR also claims, “The United States does not wish to regard 
either Russia or China as an adversary and seeks stable relations with both.”111 
The 2018 NPR represents the guiding philosophy behind contemporary 
American strategic nuclear doctrine and outlays the contemporary global environment 
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from an American perspective.112 The report asserts China’s recent military technology 
programs have been “increasingly aggressive.”113 
Figure 5: Nuclear Delivery Systems Fielded since 2010.114
The NPR uses the above chart to assert the aggressive actions of Russia, China, and 
North Korea to deploy new weapons systems. The report fails to mention that the 
United States already possessed many of the capabilities that these new weapons 
systems offer prior to the selected time period.
The emergence of China not only as a regional power but a nation capable of 
projecting influence far beyond its borders has characterized the past decade.115 The 
Chinese military has been rapidly modernizing in this time through increased spending 
112 Ibid.
113 United States. 2018. Nuclear Posture Review report. Washington, 
DC: U.S. Dept. of Defense. Pg 1.
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on research and development of new home-grown weapons systems.116 The PLA has 
initiated modernization acquisition programs for new weapons systems ranging from a 
massive shipbuilding program with the development of nuclear missile submarines to 
increases in both the variety and sheer number of missile platforms—both nuclear and 
conventional. 
Though numbers of Chinese ICBMs are growing by all estimates, the rate of 
growth and the number of nuclear weapons in the Chinese arsenal has repeatedly been 
overestimated by various agencies within the American intelligence community, as 
demonstrated in the following figure.
Figure 6: U.S. Projections for Chinese Nuclear Warheads Repeatedly Overestimate 
Actual Deployed Numbers117
The above figure represents the best estimates of numbers of Chinese nuclear warheads 
capable of reaching the United States through the year 2025. The data show that Beijing
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117 Hans M. Kristensen, “No, China Does Not Have 3,000 Nuclear 
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is for the most part adhering to its strategy of maintaining its nuclear force at “the 
minimum level required for maintaining its national security.”118 By China’s own 
admission, the minimum amount of warheads required for deterrence increases when an
adversary is fielding a ballistic missile defense system.
The United States Leaves the INF Treaty
The Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty was signed by the Soviet 
Union and the United States in 1987 with the objective of eliminating missiles with 
ranges from 500-5,500 kilometers.119 The United States withdrew from the treaty in 
2019 due in part to Chinese possession of ballistic missiles within the INF range.120 
Secretary of Defense Mark Esper stated in 2018 that the United States will begin 
deployment of intermediate range ballistic missiles in the Pacific as soon as possible.121 
This will likely take some time as the United States does not have any intermediate 
range ballistic missiles in its arsenal due to the defunct INF Treaty’s provisions. The 
proposed missiles would have to based on allied soil close to Chinese shores to place 
opposing Chinese missile batteries in range, though like the situation in Europe that led 
to the INF Treaty during the Cold War, American allies seem reluctant to host 
Washington’s missiles.122
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Specific Weapons Systems
Chinese MIRVs
The PLARF has been updating legacy ICBMs (DF-5 type missiles) to be 
capable of carrying Multiple Independent Reentry Vehicles or MIRVs and is 
developing new missiles from the ground up such as the DF-41 that are designed 
specifically to have MIRV and hypersonic capabilities.123 These are designed chiefly to 
overwhelm the missile defense systems of a potential adversary, namely the United 
States, as America is the only country to have seriously invested in national missile 
defense technology in recent years. Additionally, China has been developing long-range
solid-fueled road-mobile delivery systems (such as the DF-31 and DF-41 ICBMs) 
capable of launching with limited warning as a response to demonstrated American 
conventional and nuclear strike capabilities that could nullify the traditional Chinese 
nuclear strategy of static hardened missile silos with low alert DF-5 ICBMs.124
The Legacy Missile: The DF-5 ICBM Becomes MIRV-Capable
As the United States has publicly committed to developing missile defense 
systems in recent years, China has begun employing MIRV systems on existing 
weapons delivery vehicles such as the DF-5. The DF-5 is a liquid-fueled ICBM capable 
of reaching the continental United States. The weapon has been commissioned in the 
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PLARF’s arsenal and in operational service with a single nuclear warhead since 1981.125
The DF-5 modernization offered the PLARF the quickest route to a MIRV-enabled 
ICBM, as the existing rocket already possessed adequate lifting capacity and range to 
carry additional miniaturized warheads. In 2015 the PLARF claimed to have deployed 
the first MIRVed DF-5B in what could be interpreted as a direct response to heightened 
American rhetoric and technological advances in missile defense technology.126 
China’s DF-5 arsenal is widely geographically distributed and used to have only 
one warhead on each delivery system.127 Because of the devastating nature of a single 
warhead, in the absence of a missile defense system Chinese leaders could be confident 
in their deterrent if even a single warhead could land on a foe’s soil. The pre-launch 
survivability of the system was based primarily on the hardened nature of silos and the 
road-mobility of solid-fueled weapons systems. As American missile defense 
technology continues to develop, regardless of its effectiveness, China is hedging its 
nuclear retaliatory credibility across multiple systems to ensure it can defeat both 
missile defense and a potential American first strike aimed at wiping out the Chinese 
deterrent prior to launch. 
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SLBMs: Increasing the Survivability of the Chinese Deterrent 
In light of the wartime demonstrations of the accuracy of conventional long-
range American strike weapons such as the Tomahawk cruise missile and others, the 
Chinese government has been forced reevaluate its existing deterrence strategy. Chinese
leaders began to view their existing land-based ICBM deterrent as vulnerable to a 
potential American attack and sought to diversify their deterrent, not out of aggression, 
but to maintain its second-strike retaliatory capability. 
With these new objectives in mind, the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN)
sought to construct an inaugural class of home-grown Chinese SSBNs (nuclear-powered
ballistic missile submarines). The first vessels to represent a “credible at-sea second-
strike nuclear capability” according to the US Office of Naval Intelligence, are the Jin-
class of which 4 are currently operational.128 The weapon deployed on each of the Jin-
class vessels is the JL-2 SLBM (submarine-launched ballistic missile). Each warship is 
outfitted with 12 such weapons, and each missile is allegedly capable of carrying up to 
3 warheads.129 
The warships of the current Jin-class and future SSBNs under development 
serve the primary purpose of providing the Chinese government a nuclear deterrent that 
remains credible in the face of rapid and demonstrated accuracy advances in both 
American conventional and nuclear power. Similar to Russia’s strategy of maintaining a
128 “The PLA Navy: New Capabilities and Missions for the 21st 
Century.” Office of Naval Intelligence. Office of Naval Intelligence, 
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powerful nuclear deterrent in the post-Soviet era, the Chinese government is 
increasingly focusing its military resources on nuclear deterrence where conventional 
forces cannot match the capabilities of the United States’ military budget and resources.
Hypersonic Weapons 
At its 70th anniversary parade in October 2019, the People’s Liberation Army 
unveiled to the world the new HF-ZF hypersonic glide vehicle (HGV), mounted to a 
DF-17 medium range ballistic missile (MRBM).130 While the new weapons system 
received considerable media attention worldwide, many analysts claim the DF-17 “does
not dramatically strengthen the conventional threat that China poses to U.S. or allied 
forces in the region.”131 However, even though the HF-ZF is currently only fielded on 
an MRBM with a conventional warhead, the HGV could be adapted to carry a nuclear 
warhead and could theoretically be mounted on the DF-31 ICBM in the future. 
However, for the time being, the main threat posed by hypersonic weapons is the ability
of the HGV to evade missile defense systems and target American naval assets and land
bases in Japan and South Korea.132
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Threat Hype Analysis
This section will detail a selection of the most significant sources of hype in the 
American government, press and public about the alleged threats posed to the United 
States by recent Chinese military actions. The key areas of focus will be on the strategic
implications of Chinese hypersonic and MIRV-capable weapons, the shortcomings of 
the argument in favor of American national missile defense systems, a potential Taiwan 
crisis, and the land reclamation and militarization projects in the South China Sea.
Strategic Implications of Chinese Hypersonic Weapons
Hypersonic weapons have the potential to escalate potential conflicts between 
the United States and China in the Pacific.133 Because of the difficulty associated with 
detecting and predicting the ultimate target of a hypersonic weapon, little time is 
available for the subject of the strike to consider their options. The DF-21 medium 
range ballistic missile (MRBM) is particularly dangerous in the event of even a limited 
Sino-American conflict in the Pacific. The missile is currently fielded with multiple 
variants, and while initially all were nuclear armed, some (DF-21C/D) have been 
outfitted with conventional and anti-ship missiles.134 According to Kristensen, 
“The mix of nuclear and conventional DF-21s is potentially 
disastrous: If China were to ready conventional DF-21Cs for launch in a 
conflict, it could create the risk of misunderstanding, miscalculation, and 
133 Eleni Ekmektsioglou. "Hypersonic weapons and escalation control
in East Asia." Strategic Studies Quarterly, vol. 9, no. 2, 2015, p. 
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the potential for escalation if its adversary mistook the conventional DF-
21s for their nuclear counterparts.”135
The ambiguity of the arms mounted on the DF-21 could provide the impetus for crisis 
to spiral into nuclear war if the United States mistook an incoming conventionally 
armed Chinese warhead as nuclear and launched on warning.136
Hypersonic weapons—even when equipped with relatively small conventional 
warheads—could make the theoretical possibility of a nation to mount a “decapitating” 
strike on an adversary more likely. With the ability to strike anywhere in the world in a 
matter of minutes, accurate hypersonic weapons could theoretically be employed to 
target another nation’s leaders and military chain of command. This puts pressures on 
nations that may be threatened by hypersonic attack to put in place measures to 
decentralize their nuclear command and control capabilities. By devolving command 
and control away from the central civilian and military leaders of a nation’s 
government, more possibilities for miscalculated or mistaken strikes could occur.
While at first glance hypersonic weapons seem to offer nations unprecedented 
options for regime change and international warfighting capabilities, the overall 
strategic picture remains relatively unchanged. Nuclear deterrence will still serve to 
dissuade nuclear powers from all-out conflicts with each other, and while hypersonic 
weapons and by extent MIRVs offer the ability to break through an adversary’s missile 
defense systems, the fact remains that a relatively constrained nuclear arsenal of 
135 Ibid.
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43+. Gale Academic OneFile, https://link-gale-
com.libproxy.uoregon.edu/apps/doc/A421771129/AONE?
u=s8492775&sid=AONE&xid=56e1a097. Accessed 13 May 2020.
47
hundreds of missiles is still capable of the same feat.137 The following section will 
explore expert opinions on how Chinese hypersonic weapons and American national 
missile defense efforts significantly change (or don’t change) the international strategic 
security environment.
Chinese Hypersonic Development: Regional
China is using area-denial hypersonic (particularly anti-ship) weapons to 
increase their security in the Western Pacific.138 By denying the American military 
access to China’s near coast, the PLA is using asymmetric warfare to strip the United 
States of its advantage in conventional long-range accurate weapons targeting. For 
example, ship-born Tomahawk cruise missiles have a proven strike range of over 
900nm in combat during Operation Desert Storm in 1991.139  These and other advanced 
American conventional weapons were perceived as such a significant threat to 
incumbent Chinese nuclear forces as to provide a portion of the justification for China’s
pursuit of area-denial weapons to secure the ocean off its shores. The mere existence of 
China’s enhanced PLARF weapons has been enough to escalate tensions with the 
United States in the region. Before China’s development of hypersonic and anti-ship 
137 Hans M Kristensen, Robert S Norris, and Ivan undefined Oelrich. 
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missiles, the American Navy was able to conduct joint operations with regional allies in
the international waters near the Chinese coast. Now, every American ship in the region
is within range of Chinese warheads.140
China currently fields two rocket systems capable of carrying a hypersonic glide
vehicle (HGV) payload, one regional and one intercontinental. The regional weapon is 
the DF-17 medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM), which will be capable of anti-ship 
missions off the Chinese coast (1000-1500 miles offshore) with an HGV warhead.141 
The DF-17 was designed from the ground up to carry HGV warheads, and is the first 
Chinese missile developed with hypersonic capabilities in mind.142 The particular 
hypersonic glide vehicle mounted to the Df-17 rocket is the DF-ZF, which is capable of 
speeds up to Mach 10 and of performing “extreme maneuvers” to avoid interception.143 
This hypersonic weapons platform is provides China with a potent counter to deployed 
American military assets in the Pacific as it puts major American and allied bases in 
Japan, and South Korea in range of a Chinese missile attack with little to no warning. 
According to most analysists, the DF-17 with a DF-ZF HGV is currently not capable of 
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mounting a nuclear warhead, but nuclear capability remains a possible upgrade for the 
system in the future. 
The primary regional concern for the United States and other powers operating 
in the western Pacific is the threat posed to American and allied warships operating in 
the area.144 Missile defense systems like Lockheed Martin’s advanced Aegis missile 
defense platform deployed on American and Japanese warships have not demonstrated 
the ability to intercept hypersonic missiles and could thus be acutely vulnerable to the 
DF-ZF HGV.145 While these developments could provide challenges to American naval 
operations in littoral areas near the China coast (particularly concerning Taiwan) these 
weapons do not represent a vital national security concern to the continental United 
States due to their areas of deployment primarily on the Chinese coast and effective 
ranges.
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Figure 7: Ranges of Chinese Regional Missiles 146
Chinese Hypersonic Development: Intercontinental
While the DF-17 and DF-ZF HGV represent regional hypersonic capabilities, 
the road-mobile solid-fueled DF-41 ICBM paired with a hypersonic (or MIRV) 
warhead delivery system represents a more pressing threat to the United States. Due to 
the nature of ICBM flight trajectories, all of the DF-41 MIRVs will travel at hypersonic 
speeds on reentry.147 Defense analysts estimate the DF-41 when deployed will have a 
range capable of striking anywhere within the continental United States in 30 minutes 
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https://missilethreat.csis.org/country/china/.
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or less.148 Information on the origins and rationale for the development of the DF-41 is 
murky. The earliest academic reports of the missile in development appeared in the year
1999 with reports claiming the missile was part of the Chinese government’s aim to 
replace the incumbent DF-5, which had been in service since the early 1980s.149 The 
purpose of the DF-41’s development is reduce the Chinese nuclear deterrent’s 
vulnerability to a decapitating first strike and to break through missile defense systems. 
The new ICBMs are designed to be launched much faster than the liquid-fueled silo-
based DF-5 due to their solid-fueled design and can be readied to fire in minutes.150 
Perhaps more pressing that the DF-41’s alleged hypersonic capabilities are the 
rumors that the new missile can likely be outfitted with a rumored 10 warheads on 
MIRVs. The Federation of American Scientists suggests that this number is likely too 
high and predicts the DF-41 will likely be outfitted with a maximum of three MIRV 
warheads.151
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Strategic Implications of Chinese MIRVs
MIRVs and Missile Defense: Cold War Lessons Unlearned 
The United States was the first nation to develop nuclear missiles with Multiple 
Independently targetable Reentry Vehicle (MIRV) technology during the height of the 
Cold War. These warheads were first deployed on the Minuteman III ICBM system in 
1970, and the following year on the Poseidon SLBM (Submarine Launched Ballistic 
Missile).152 MIRV technology was not initially developed or deployed to defeat missile 
defense. Instead, researchers in the Department of Defense cited a strategic concern 
regarding the number of single-warhead missiles in the American arsenal. According to 
Dr. John Foster, Director, Defense, Research and Engineering, US Dept. of Defense, “it 
was found that the total number of aim points exceeded the number of Minuteman 
missiles.”153 Therefore, MIRV technology was developed to meet offensive strategic 
objectives without dramatically increasing the number of ICBM missiles in the 
American arsenal, an objective stated by Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, who 
saw a “fully credible offensive assured destruction capability” as the most important 
element of American national security.154
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By the time MIRV systems were first deployed, it was discovered that the Soviet
Union had developed and deployed an anti-ballistic missile system around Moscow 
called “Galosh.”155 While the United States did not develop MIRVs to defeat an ABM 
system, American defense planners and politicians came to the conclusion that the new 
technology could be used to mitigate the effectiveness of the Russian ABM system by 
overwhelming its targeting computers and interceptors with multiple warheads. Defense
Secretary Melvin Laird was quoted in a 1969 congressional hearing where he claimed, 
“[MIRV] was not related to Galosh because we started appropriating funds for the 
development of this program prior to the time we knew Galosh was in being.”156 
In response to American MIRVs the Soviet Union fielded its own MIRVed 
ICBMs in 1975 and SLBMs in 1978.157 These Soviet advances in MIRV technology had
been predicted by McNamara a decade earlier, and had been one of the principle 
reasons the Secretary of Defense was opposed to the large scale deployment of 
American missile defense systems—arguing the long-term security of both countries 
would be hindered rather than helped by the massive expenditures caused by the advent 
of ABM systems and their relative ineffectiveness in the face of MIRVed missiles. 
McNamara argued, “Were we to deploy a heavy ABM system throughout the United 
States, the Soviets would clearly be strongly motivated to increase their offensive 
capability so as to cancel out our defensive advantage.”158 Although not their original 
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intent, MIRV technology provided an effective countermeasure to overcome any 
potential defensive strategy that relied on missile defense.
Chinese MIRVs Today
It should come as no surprise that the China is fielding MIRV-capable ICBMs 
today. The United States went down this road with the Soviet Union during the Cold 
War, which culminated in the signing of the ABM Treaty when both sides realized the 
resulting arms race was counterproductive to their own respective national security. 
Though China’s MIRVs are specifically being deployed to counter ABM advances by 
the United States, some still argue that China is aiming to develop an offensive 
capability.159 When looking at the overall picture of Chinese modernization, this is 
simply not true.
An offensive nuclear capability requires a counterforce doctrine where an 
aggressor can target and destroy most—if not all—of another’s nuclear weapons in a 
disarming first strike.160 China does not possess nearly enough weapons to have the 
capability to carry out a counterforce strike on American deterrent forces. High end 
estimates of the Chinese arsenal place the number of Chinese warheads capable of 
targeting the United States at roughly 90.161 Given that the United States fields over 
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1,500 deployed nuclear weapons dispersed geographically and across its various nuclear
triad systems, to assert that China could be pursuing a first strike capability would be 
extremely misleading.162 Overall Chinese arsenal growth has proven slow, existing 
capabilities are being augmented to ensure Beijing’s deterrent is capable of penetrating 
the American national missile defense system deployed in Alaska and California as well
as any future upgrades the system may see. 
China currently does not possess enough fissile material for a significant nuclear
arms build-up.163 A similar effect to MIRV systems could be achieved through 
inexpensive decoy or chaff systems. In the midcourse phase of an ICBM’s launch 
process (the phase in which the current American missile defense system aims to 
intercept incoming ICBMs) decoy warheads of different weights are impossible for the 
system to distinguish from the real warhead. This is because the flight path of both 
decoys and real warheads would be identical in space (regardless of their different 
weights) due to the absence of atmospheric drag.  There is disagreement among some 
scholars about whether the PLARF has actually developed MIRV capability for the DF-
5B, or whether the updated missile is actually equipped with decoys—a far more cost-
effective option. Regardless of whether the missile is equipped with MIRV or decoys, 
the effect the weapon will have on overwhelming a missile defense battery is the same.  
Historically, the existence of this relatively inexpensive workaround has left proponents
162 “Fact Sheets & Briefs,” Nuclear Weapons: Who Has What at a 
Glance | Arms Control Association, accessed May 19, 2020, 
https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/Nuclearweaponswhohaswhat
)
163 “Why China Stopped Making Fissile Material for Nukes,” Bulletin 
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and developers of missile defense systems with an unsolvable problem that dates back 
to the very beginnings of American missile defense efforts.
Chinese development and deployment of MIRVs is not evidence of an offensive 
buildup, which would take decades and require enormous sums to even reach parity 
with the United States (much less achieve the superior numbers required for a 
counterforce strategy). Instead Beijing is adapting its arsenal as the requirements for a 
minimum deterrent have changed.
 American Missile Defense Systems
In the aftermath of the American withdrawal from the ABM Treaty the Bush 
administration tasked the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) with fielding a national 
missile defense as soon as possible.164 The MDA produced and fielded a limited number
of Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) interceptors in Alaska and California in 
2004.165 Like SDI before it, the MDA and its GMD system have spent billions with 
relatively little progress made towards a robust national missile defense. Today, the 
MDA lists a total of 44 GMD interceptors fielded, with a success rate of only about 
52% even under unrealistic idealized testing scenarios.166 Many of the tests that have 
taken place have been under scripted scenarios where the system was fed data on the 
exact flight path of the “enemy” ICBM beforehand. In some cases, the target warhead 
164 George Lewis, and Frank von Hippel. “Limitations on Ballistic 
Missile Defense, Past and Possibly Future.” Bulletin of the Atomic 
Scientists. Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, June 28, 2018. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/00963402.2018.1486575.
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166 “GMD: Frequently Asked Questions.” Center for Arms Control and
Non-Proliferation. Accessed May 14, 2020. 
https://armscontrolcenter.org/issues/missile-defense/gmd-frequently-
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even was equipped with a homing system to aid the interceptor in target acquisition 
among dummy decoy warheads.167 The system has not demonstrated any significant 
improvements in recent testing either, as the following figure demonstrates.
Figure 8: Ground-Based Midcourse Defense Intercept Tests
Given the GMD’s doubtful effectiveness, the MDA is looking to augment its missile 
defense capabilities through adapting other systems from across the Department of 
Defense inventory. Perhaps the most notable national missile defense transplant is the 
technology borrowed from the US Navy’s Aegis weapons system.
Aegis, developed by Lockheed Martin originally for deployment on US cruisers 
and destroyers, was initially intended for theater missile defense of military assets. With
the development of the new standard missile (SM-3 Block IIA) by Raytheon, American 
167 “Incremental Progress but No Realistic Capability,” Union of 
Concerned Scientists, accessed May 19, 2020, 
https://www.ucsusa.org/resources/analysis-gmd-missile-defense-test-
ftg-15)
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warships and new Aegis ashore land-based platforms are working toward building the 
capability to shoot down some ICBMs.168 The SM-3 has thus far proven more reliable 
than the GMD program with 34 success in 43 intercept tests as of October 2019.169 It is, 
however, important to note that thus far SM-3 tests have not been conducted against 
ICBMs, but shorter range ballistic missiles.170 The MDA plans to test the SM-3 Block 
IIA against a target ICBM during 2020.171 Regardless of qualitative advantages of 
forward deployed SM-3 missiles, operating within range of Chinese MRBMs and 
SRBMs means that China will likely always enjoy the numerical advantage required to 
overwhelm the system, especially given the relatively low cost of ballistic missiles 
relative to interceptors.172 This always lends China a defensive home-field advantage, 
but still does not prove any offensive intent.
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Militarization of Contested Islands in the South China Sea
China has been building artificial islands in the South China Sea since 2014.173 
These islands serve to assert Chinese sovereignty over the resource rich surrounding 
waters, which are dispute by several other neighboring countries. The Philippines, 
Vietnam, Taiwan, Brunei and Malaysia all have disputes with China over this territory, 
and the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea ruled that Chinese claims 
were in violation of international maritime law in 2016.174 None of these regional 
countries have the power to challenge Chinese territorial aspirations. While the United 
States does not endorse any specific claim to the islands, American warships are 
regularly sent on Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPS) to ensure international 
maritime laws are upheld.175 
One of the principle American concerns with China’s offshore military bases is 
that the Chinese could effectively choke one-third of the world’s total sea trade.176 This 
argument is inherently flawed as China is by far the largest trading economy operating 
in the South China Sea—it would be counterproductive for China to strangle its own 
trade in a potential crisis.177 Given that only about 3% of all trade flowing through the 
173 ABC News (ABC News Network), accessed May 19, 2020, 
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transits-south-china-sea/)
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South China Sea is destined for the United States, even if China were to stifle trade the 
impact would be much greater on the Chinese economy than the United States’.178
Given the high profile and posture of the United States to test overreaching 
territorial claims and China’s unflinching claim over the disputed region it seems likely 
that neither is going to allow the other concessions in the South China Sea. The United 
States will continue FONOPs and the Chinese will hold their manmade ground. 
Demonstrating this assessment while speaking on FONOP flyover operations, American
Commander Chris Purcell remarked, 
“What they want is for us to leave, and then they can say that we left 
because this is their sovereign territory. It’s kind of their way to try to 
legitimize their claims, but we are clear that we are operating in 
international airspace and are not doing anything different from what 
we’ve done for decades.”179
While not necessarily a harbinger of doom, the close operational proximity of American
and Chinese military assets increases the risk of a crisis that could lead to a larger 
conflict. There have already been multiple incidents where Chinese warships had near 
misses with American vessels within miles of Chinese bases in the Spratly and Paracel 
Islands.180
178 Ibid.
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Perhaps the greatest reason for the hype of Chinese militarization in the South 
China Sea is that the installations themselves are physically visible. This is 
demonstrated in the following image.
Figure 9: Chinese Fortifications Under Construction at Subi Reef in the South China 
Sea
The airbases and missile silos are clearly visible from space and provide the most 
readily apparent example of Chinese armament. The islands can also be seen as an 
aggressive measure, potentially giving Chinese armed forces longer striking range for 
land-based missiles and placing yet more contested territory like Taiwan in easy reach 
of Chinese air forces. They are a key example of Chinese power projection beyond its 
borders, though it is worth noting that, as a regional hegemon, China would be expected
to exercise claims over resources off its shores. The United States was likely never 
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interested in claiming resources rights in an area so far from its shores, so thus 
American interests are not as threatened as many claim they may be.
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An Arms Race with China is Not Inevitable
“China is not an enemy.”181 In response to recent actions by the Trump 
administration, a significant group of influential American thinkers penned a letter to 
the White House and Congress calling for a change in American defense policy toward 
China. This paper reaches a similar conclusion. Budgetary analysis has proven that even
though China is spending more now than ever before on defense, the gulf between the 
United States and Beijing remains significant. Additionally, when Chinese nuclear 
modernization was prioritized following the American withdrawal from the ABM 
Treaty, the advances in Chinese weapons systems have been primarily focused on 
countering American missile defense rather than producing an offensive advantage. 
The United States would be well served to back away from any weapons 
development programs that could be interpreted as offensive posturing against China. 
Such programs could likely result in outcomes detrimental to both American and 
Chinese interests. Rather than building arms, Washington and Beijing should focus on 
building bridges. Just because China’s influence is growing does not mean the United 
States’ position as the world’s preeminent military power is in jeopardy. Deterrence 
holds in the 21st century and the United States should not pursue a warfighting strategy 
against China. 
While the United States may have to live with some concessions—namely the 
Chinese reclamation of land and the home-field advantage enjoyed by short and 
181 J. Stapleton Roy M. Taylor Fravel, “Opinion | China Is Not an 
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medium range Chinese ballistic missiles—Washington can be content in the security of 
its nuclear arsenal and the strength of its worldwide network of alliances. As a great 
power, it may be reasonable for China to control a sphere of influence close to its 
shores. By giving China space to operate its SSBNs, Washington can assure Beijing’s 
confidence in its own deterrent, dissuading further Chinese vertical nuclear 
proliferation.
Perhaps the biggest bargaining chip Washington has on the table is ballistic 
missile defense. If the United States could negotiate the cancellation or reduction of its 
own national missile defense it could likely achieve Chinese concessions. This could 
remove much of the rationale for each side’s arms buildups and potentially lead to 
future arms control agreements.
The United States has built an international system based on promoting 
democratic ideals and freedom of trade throughout the world. Through this leadership 
Washington has been able to build strong alliances and foster more cooperation than 
conflict. The United States should not see China’s economic and military growth as a 
challenger to stifle, but a new partner to accommodate. Through strengthening existing 
alliances, the United States can use geopolitical and economic incentives to foster 
cooperation with China in an international system where the United States still 
maintains the preeminent role. An arms race with China is not inevitable.
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